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Abstract: 
This paper examines the location of duopolists on a tree. Given parametric prices, we first delineate necessary 
and sufficient conditions for locational Nash equilibria on trees. Given these conditions, we then show that Nash 
equilibria, provided they exist, can be reached in a repeated sequential relocation process in which both facil-
ities follow short-term profit maximization objectives. 
 
Zusammenfassung: 
In der Arbeit werden die Standorte von Duopolisten in einem Baum untersucht. Unter der Annahme 
festgesetzter Preise werden notwendige and hinreichende Bedingungen für Nash Gleichgewichte für Standorte 
auf Bäumen hergeleitet. Unter Verwendung dieser Bedingungen wird dann gezeigt, daB — angenommen Nash 
Gleichgewichte existieren — diese in einem wiederholt angewandten sequentiellen StandortfindungsprozeB, in 
dem beide Duopolisten als Zielfunktion kurzfristige Gewinnmaximierung haben, auch erreicht werden. 
 
“Equilibrium is a place in heaven, but how do we get there from here?” 
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Article: 
1 Introduction 
Competitive location models were introduced by Hotelling (1929) who studied the price-setting and locational 
behavior of two duopolists, who compete for a common market in the shape of a line segment. Results of the 
model and their implications were of immediate interest to economists, geographers, political scientists, 
marketing researchers, and, more recently, operations researchers. Applications of competitive location models 
range from brand positioning problems and political positioning to models that examine locations of competing 
facilities within an industry, such as fast-food chains. The main interest in these models is based on their 
explanatory power. A survey of competitive location models is provided by Friesz et al. (1988) and a 
framework and taxonomy is found in Eiselt et al. (1993). 
 
Hakimi (1983) was the first to consider competitive location models on a network and hence bring them to the 
attention to management scientists. The simplest scenario involves two decision makers who locate a fixed, but 
not necessarily equal, number of facilities each in some given space. One of the solution concepts for this 
problem is the Nash equilibrium; a locational arrangement in which neither decision maker has an incentive to 
unilaterally relocate any of his facilities. Nash equilibria are well studied in economic game theory. In the 
locational context, some aspects of Nash equilibria were investigated by Labbd and Hakimi (1991). Two major 
questions arise when considering Nash equilibria. The first concerns their existence and their uniqueness. In 
general, the existence of locational Nash equilibria depends highly on the specific model under consideration, 
thus reaffirming the well-known sensitivity of Hotelling models. As an example, given fixed and equal prices, a 
locational Nash equilibrium exists on trees, but may not exist on general graphs. Assuming that at least one 
Nash equilibrium exist, the second question is then: given arbitrary initial locations of the competitors and a set 
of objectives followed by the duopolists who relocate according to a given set of rules, will they ever reach any 
one of the equilibria? If this question can be answered in the affirmative for at least on pair of equilibrium loca-
tions, we will refer to the equilibria as reachable. Some progress on reachability has been made in the context 
of voting theory (see, e.g., Tovey 1993). Hakimi (1990) shows that reachability is guaranteed on trees in the 
case of fixed and equal prices, given a specific demand allocation rule. Using the same rule, Hakimi shows that 
in a general graph where facilities are permitted to locate anywhere, equilibria may not be reached even if each 
decision maker locates only one facility and the graph is as simple as a cycle with three vertices. Similarly, he 
shows that an equilibrium may not even be reachable on a tree network in case one decision maker locates one 
and the other two facilities. In our research, we investigate the simple case of duopolists who each locate a 
single facility at a vertex of a tree network, and each facility charges a fixed price. This paper will answer the 
question whether or not equilibria exist and, if so, if they are reachable. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we state some useful results concerning Nash equilibria 
along with some basic concepts that are used later in the paper. In Section 3, we then investigate the reachability 
of equilibria given two facilities that charge fixed, but unequal, prices. 
 
2 Nash equilibria on trees 
In this section we first introduce our basic model. We then restate some useful results on trees and locational 
Nash equilibria as well as their relations to medians. Consider a tree T = (V, E), where V = {v1, v2, ..., vn} is the 
set of vertices and E = {eij: vi, vj ∈ V} symbolizes the set of undirected edges. By dij we denote the length of 
edge eij in case vi and vj are connected by an edge, and the length of the (unique) path between vi and vj in case 
these two vertices are not connected by an edge. Customers are assumed to be located at the vertices of the tree. 
Their demands are wi > 0 ∀ vi ∈ V which are satisfied by the facility that offers the lowest full price, i.e., mill 
price plus transport cost. The reason for requiring positive rather than nonnegative weights at the vertices is that 
allowing zero weights renders the analysis quite messy without providing further insight. Furthermore, without 
loss of realism we require that |V| > 2. As in many competitive location models, transport costs are assumed to 
be linear with unit transport cost normalized to one, so that it costs dij dollars to ship one unit from vi to Two 
facilities A and B are assumed to supply customers. The facilities are restricted to locate at vertices of the tree 
and their current locations are denoted by vA and vB, respectively. The mill prices charged at facilities A and B 
are pA and pB; since Hakimi (1990) has already dealt with the case of equal prices, we restrict ourselves to 
unequal prices PA and pB. Without loss of generality let pA < pB. Whenever customers at a vertex v, purchase 
from facility A, we will say that facility A “captures” vi, a concept first introduced by Stackelberg (1943) and 
later rediscovered by ReVelle (1986). Formally, facility A captures all demand at vertex vi, if pA + dAi ≤ pB + dBi. 
Thus A's market area is M(A) = {vi: pA + dAj ≤ pB + dBi} and M(B) = {v pB+ dB, < pA + dAi}. Note that we have 
assumed that ties are broken in favor of the less expensive facility A. This tie breaking rule is somewhat 
arbitrary; we have modeled it after the “incumbent advantage” rule that has been used, yet stirred controversies, 
for a long time (for a short survey see, e.g., Tirole 1995). The demands (or sales) captured by the duopolists can 
then be expressed as             ∈     and similar for S(B), and the profits are ℘(A) = pA S(A) and ℘(B) = 
pB S(B), respectively. As prices in this paper are parametric, maximization of ℘(A) and ℘(B) is equivalent to 
maximizing S(A) and S(B). 
 
In this paper, we investigate a process, in which two decision makers sequentially relocate their facilities so as 
to maximize S(A) and S(B), respectively. This process is repeated until it converges. In particular, we employ 
three rules in the individual optimization process: 
 
(1) A facility, when given the option to relocate, will do so by maximizing its profit given its opponent's 
current location. The result is referred to as a (1|1) medianoid (see, e.g., Hakimi 1983). Note that this is a short-
term view as it pays no attention to the potential reactions of the competing facility. 
(2) The facilities move in a sequential manner. The idea is that it takes a certain amount of time for a facility to 
react to its opponent's action, so that a facility planner has an opportunity to maximize its profit now. 
(3) Location at the same vertex is prohibited. While this rule sounds somewhat restrictive, there are good 
reasons for employing it. One reason is that in the case of fixed and unequal prices, if location at the same 
vertex were allowed, then the less expensive facility could always completely annihilate its opponent by 
locating at the same vertex. Moreover, due to the discrete nature of space available for location, it is not realistic 
to assume that facilities can actually co-locate. 
 
In the following we restate a few definitions and lemmas regarding trees which are used in this paper. 
 
Definition 1. The weight of a subtree T
k
= (V
k
, E
k
) with V
k
 c V and E
k
= ei,E E and v„ vjE V
k
} is defined as 
the sum of weights of its vertices, i.e., w(T
k
)=wi. The weight of the entire tree is w (T). is E V
k 
 
Definition 2. Given some vertex vk, the subtrees spanned by vk are obtained by deleting from T the vertex vk as 
well as all edges incident to it. The subtrees can then be numbered as   
 ,   
 ,… with w    
   ≥ w    
   ≥… 
where ties are broken arbitrarily. A subtree   
  is called heavier than a subtree   
 , i < j. 
 
It is also useful to restate the classical. 
 
Lemma 3 (Goldman 1971). A vertex vq is a median, if and only if w (  
 
) ≤ ½w(T), i.e., the largest subtree 
spanned by vq has a demand that is no more than half of the total market's demand. 
 
Lemma 3 implies immediately 
 
Corollary 4 (Median Location Corollary). For any vertex vk ∈ V with w(  
 ) > ½w(T) the median vq ∈   
  
 
We are now able to formally define Nash equilibria. 
 
Definition 5. A locational Nash equilibrium is a pair of locations (vA, vB) = (v
*
, v
**
), such that 
 
℘ (A: vA = v
*
, vB = v
**
) ≥ ℘(A: vA ≠ v
*
, vB = v
**
) 
 
and 
 
℘ (B: vA = v
*
, vB = v
**
) ≥ ℘(B: vA = v
*
, vB ≠ v
**
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In other words, a locational Nash equilibrium is a locational arrangement in which neither facility can gain an 
advantage by relocating unilaterally. In some cases, it is easy to find locational Nash equilibria. For instance, 
the case of equal prices has an easy solution (see, e.g., Wendell and McKelvey 1981, Hakimi 1990). 
 
Consider now the case of unequal but fixed, i.e., parametric, prices. Here, it will be useful to consider for any 
pair of locations vA ≠ vB the subdivision of the given tree into three subsets: the hinterland of A, the hinterland 
of B, and the competitive region. Facility A's hinterland consists of vertices which can be reached from vA only 
via vB. The vertices vA and vB are assumed to be included in their own respective hinterlands. All vertices that 
are not included in either of the two hinterlands are said to be in the competitive region. For the analysis of this 
case, we need to restate a definition introduced by Eiselt (1992). 
 
Definition 6. Two vertices vA and vB are said to be sufficiently spatially separated (SSS), if dAB > SSS = |pA − 
pB|. Furthermore, a vertex vi is said to be edge-protected, if 
 
dij > SSS eij ∈ E. 
 
In essence, both, the concept of sufficient spatial separation and that of edge-protection guarantee, given our tie 
breaking rule, that the weaker, i.e., more expensive, facility B is protected from the stronger, i.e., less expensive, 
facility A. Here, protection refers to the fact that a facility is located so as to enable it to capture its own 
hinterland. This is somewhat reminiscent of predator — prey models with A preying on B, where B is 
temporarily protected if it locates SSS away from A (who, in its next move, will attempt to cut out B), and B is 
permanently protected (at least as long as it does not relocate) if it locates at an edge- protected vertex. The 
concept of protection is one of the major differences between Hotelling's linear market and models on trees with 
facilities allowed to locate only at vertices, as linear markets allow facilities to locate arbitrarily close to each 
other and thus provide no protection whatsoever. 
 
We are now ready to delineate conditions for locational Nash equilibria on trees given differential parametric 
prices. For convenience, define now a "circle" around vA with radius SSS by CA = {vi: diA ≤ SSS} and similar 
circles CB, C*, and around vertices vB, v*, and v**, respectively. These circles are designed, so that if facility B 
were to locate anywhere inside CA then it is cut out and A captures the entire market. Similarly, if A locates in 
CB facility B is again cut out. Observe that generally, CB ⊆ M(B) and similar for CA and M(A). 
 
In the following we characterize locational Nash equilibria. Lemmas 7 and 9 provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a Nash equilibrium to exist. The proofs of both lemmas are provided in the appendix. 
 
Lemma 7. Let at least one edge-protected vertex exist in T. Then a pair of locations (v
*
, v
**
) is a locational Nash 
equilibrium, if and only if 
 
(a) v** is edge-protected 
(b) v** has the heaviest hinterland of any vertex outside C*. 
(c) M(A)=   
   
 
For the discussion in the next section, it is useful to prove the following 
 
Lemma 8. Assume that there exists at least one edge-protected vertex in T, but none of the medians vq is edge-
protected. Furthermore, let Cq, resp. C*, be a circle around vq, resp. v*, with radius SSS. Then 
 
(a) v* ∈ Cq 
(b) v**∉ Cq 
(c) v** ∉ C*. 
 
Consider now the case in which there exist no edge-protected vertices in the given tree. We can then prove 
 
Lemma 9. Suppose that there exists no edge-protected vertex in T. Then a (degenerate) locational Nash equilib-
rium exists if and only if there exists at least one vertex vi such that Ci  = V. 
 
Proof. Sufficiency of the condition is easily proved. Let vA = vi, then the condition implies that regardless of B's 
location, S(A) = w(T) and S(B) = 0. Neither facility can improve, implying that v
*
 = vi and v
**
 anywhere else is a 
locational Nash equilibrium. 
 
To prove necessity, assume that there exists no vertex vi satisfying the above condition. Then either S (A) = w 
(T) and S(B)=0 in which case facility B can locate at some 0 CA and obtain at least wi> 0 thus improving its 
current sales; or S(A)< w (T) and S (B) > 0 in which case A can relocate adjacent to B. As vB cannot be edge-
protected as, by assumption, no edge-protected vertices exist, A cuts out B and captures the entire market. This 
contradicts the existence of a locational Nash equilibrium.  ∎ 
 
It is worthwhile to point out that at equilibrium, the two facilities may not be adjacent. A counterexample is 
given in. Fig. 1, where the double-digit weights and the single- digit distances are shown next to vertices and 
edges, respectively. Furthermore, SSS = 6, and v
*
 = v3, v
**
 = v7 is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
 
There are two special cases that can be dealt with easily. For this purpose, define   
 
 as the vertex adjacent to a 
median vq that is located in the heaviest subtree spanned by vq. In other words,   
  ∈   
 
 and the edge (vq,   
 ) ∈ 
E. Then the two special cases are summarized in  
 
Corollary 10. If one of the medians vq is edge-protected, then v
*
 =   
  and v
**
 = vq is a locational Nash 
equilibrium. Similarly, if   
  is edge-protected, then v
*
 = vq and v
**
 =   
  is a locational Nash equilibrium. 
 
The proof of Corollary 10 is done by checking the conditions of Lemma 7 for the two special cases and is 
omitted here. Note that in both cases v
*
 and v
**
 are generally not interchangeable. 
 
The problem investigated in the next two sections can now formally be stated as follows. Given two facilities A 
and B that are located arbitrarily at vA, and vB, respectively. An equilibrium exists at vertices v
*
 and v
**
, 
respectively. The question is then: given that the decision makers of both facilities use short-term profit 
maximizing objectives and relocate in a sequential manner, will A and B relocate so that after a finite number of 
steps vA = v
*
 and vB= v
**
? 
 
3 Reachability of equilibria in case of unequal prices 
In order to stimulate the discussion, we will first provide a numerical example in which both competitors 
behave as assumed above, but a locational Nash equilibrium may not be reached despite its existence. 
 
For convenience, we represent the profits or payoffs of the two competitors in a matrix. For that purpose, denote 
by 4 the profit of facility A given that vA = vi and vB= vj, and similar fore. Then the matrix P = [(pt, pi
i
!j)] is the 
payoff matrix of the associated bimatrix game. In our case of unequal, but fixed, prices the game is not a constant-
sum game, but there is a constant-sum game with payoffs equaling market capture, which is equivalent to the 
revenue- maximizing original game in the sense that a Nash equilibrium in one game is also a Nash equilibrium in 
the other.  
 
 
 With prices pA = 2 and pB =3, the payoff matrix P for the problem in Fig. 2 is: 
 
 
 
The row and column minima have been added to indicate the players' worst-case scenarios. Here, a saddle point 
exists: the location pairs (v2, v4) and (v3, v4) are indeed Nash equilibria as neither facility has an incentive to 
move out of its current location. 
 
Suppose that the current locational configuration is (v4, v2) and it is A's turn to relocate. A will move to (v3, v2), 
where B now has the choice between (v3, v4) and (v3, v5). Assume that B chooses to relocate to (v3, v5). At that 
point, A has no choice but to move to (v4, v5). Here, B may either relocate to (v4, v2) or (v4, v3), and we assume 
that B moves to (v4, v2). Now the two facilities have moved in cyclical fashion, and as long as B does not change 
his strategy to pick a new location in case of a tie, they will continue on this cycle without ever reaching of the 
equilibria at (v2, v4) and (v3, v4). Inspection reveals that in this example, randomization among the best strategies 
will lead to an equilibrium, a property similar to absorbing states in Markov chains. The question is whether or 
not convergence to an equilibrium can be proved in general. 
 
Tackling the problem as a general bimatrix game suggests that equilibria, if they exist, may not necessarily be 
reached. As an example, consider the following payoff matrix of a constant-sum game, where the strategies of 
the two players are shown as   
 ,   
 , and   
  for player A and   
 ,   
 , and   
  for player B. 
 
 
 
The element (  
 ,   
 ) is the unique Nash equilibrium. However, suppose that the initial strategy mix is (  
 ,   
 ). 
Now facility A will change strategy to (  
 ,   
 ), then B changes to (  
 ,   
 ), A subsequently changes to (  
 ,   
 ) 
and then B changes to (  
 ,   
 ) and we have reached the initial strategy mix. Here, randomization in case of a tie 
does not help and the above example illustrates that in general bimatrix games Nash equilibria may not be 
reached at all, not only by virtue of the "wrong" choice of tie breaking rule. 
 
In order to analyze the reachability problem with sequential moves in our location model, it is useful to first 
examine the basic moves of the two facilities. Suppose that facility B is located at some vertex vB. Then we 
must distinguish between two cases. 
Case 1. Vertex vB is edge-protected. Then A cannot cut out B and will locate in   
 . One of A’s optimal 
strategies is to locate at   
  although other choices may exist. One such example is shown in Figure 1, given SSS 
< 7 and vB = v7. Here, A may locate at v6 or v3, capturing w(T) − w7 in both cases. 
 
Case 2. Vertex vB is not edge-protected. Now A can cut out B and will do so by locating at some vertex vA so 
that dAB ≤ SSS. As by assumption vB is not edge-protected, such a vertex vA always exists. Facility A then 
captures the entire market w(T). This leads to 
 
Relocation Rule RR1. Given the location of a vertex vB, facility A will always locate at a vertex vA, so that if vB 
is edge-protected, A locates so as to capture its own hinterland as well as the entire competitive region; 
otherwise vA is chosen, so that dAB ≤ SSS. 
 
Suppose now that facility A's location is temporarily fixed at some vertex vA. As defined in Sect. 2, a circle CA 
around vA consists of all vertices that are no farther than SSS from vA. If B were to locate at any vertex in CA, it 
would be cut out and its market share would drop to zero. Clearly, if CA = V, facility B must accept defeat and 
live with zero sales. It cannot do better, and neither can A, so that a Nash equilibrium is reached. Suppose now 
that there exists at least one vertex vi ∉ CA. Facility B will now locate at one such vertex, so as to maximize its 
market share. Note that B can always do so by locating at a vertex vB, so that all vertices on the path [vA, vB[ are 
in CA. Otherwise, could simply move closer to A without losing any demand in its hinterland and possibly gain 
in the competitive region. This implies 
 
Relocation Rule RR2. Given that facility A locates at a vertex vA facility B will always locate just outside CA at 
a vertex vB that maximizes the demand in its own hinterland. 
 
In order to prove reachability, we first deal with the easy case in which no edge-protected vertex exists and a 
locational Nash equilibrium, if it exists, must be degenerate. As per Lemma 9, there must exist a vertex v*, such 
that C* = V. Suppose that at present, B is located optimally with respect to A and it is now A’s turn to relocate. If 
vA = v
*
, and equilibrium has been reached. Let now vA ≠ v
*
. If B is located at some vB, so that M(B) = 0, then 
neither facility can improve its market area and an equilibrium has been reached. Suppose now that B captures 
M(B) > 0. As by assumption no edge-protected vertices exist, A can relocate so as to cut out B. In particular, if 
currently vB= v*, then A can locate at v*, thus reaching an equilibrium. If vB = v*, then A can locate at some vA 
and cut out B; in the next step B moves out of v* (if it cannot improve, we have again reached an equilibrium), 
so that A can then locate at v* when it is its turn. This demonstrates the reachability of a Nash equilibrium in 
case no edge-protected vertex exists. 
 
Consider now the case in which at least one edge-protected vertex exists and assume that vA, vB ∉ Cq. Let A be 
temporarily fixed at vA and B relocates to some vertex vB. We can then prove 
 
Lemma 11. If vA, vB ∉ Cq then VB̂ ∈ pAq = ]vA, vq], such that dAB̂ > SSS and there exists no other vertex vk ∈ pAq 
with dAk < dAB̂ i.e., facility B locates on the path pAq just outside CA. 
 
Proof. The fact that vA ∉ Cq implies vq ∉ o CA and thus vB̂ must be located in A's hinterland or in the region 
between vq and vA. Now corollary 4 implies that Cq ⊆   
  and RR2 then indicates that B will not locate in A's 
hinterland. Furthermore, if there were a vertex vk, such that vk ∈ pAB̂ and vk ∈ CA then B would capture at least 
S(B̂) + wk by locating at vk which is no less than if B had located at vB̂. Hence we can conclude that B locates on 
pAq just outside CA.   ∎ 
 
Consider now facility A's move. From vB̂ ∉ CA follows vA ∉ CB̂. If vB̂ is edge-protected, then CB̂ = {vB̂} and A's 
optimal location (or at least one of its optimal locations) is at vB̂ =    
 B. Then corollary 4 implies that vq ∈   
   
and the distance between the median and A's new location is 
        −     −           
 
implying that facility A has moved closer to the median. 
 
If, on the other hand, vertex vB̂ is not edge-protected, facility A will locate at some vertex vÂ so that dÂB̂  ≤ SSS 
and B is cut out. Then 
 
        −                                      
 
and again, A is located closer to the median vq than in the previous iteration. Defining a relocation round as two 
successive moves by the competitors, one by A and one by B, then the above discussion implies. 
 
Lemma 12. After at most n relocation rounds, facility A or B will locate in Cq. 
 
By virtue of Lemma 12, we can now assume that facility A or B (or both) is (are) located in Cq. Consider first 
the special case of an edge-protected median, i.e., Cq= {vq}. As per Lemma 12, A or B will eventually locate at 
vq. Suppose vA = vq. Then B will locate at vB=   
  where it is not cut out. If   
  is edge-protected, the conditions 
of Lemma 7 are satisfied and an equilibrium has been reached. If   
  is not edge-protected, then A can cut out B 
by relocating at some vertex vÂ =   
 , k ≠ 1, so that dÂB SSS. Facility B's optimal reaction is then to relocate at vB̂
= vq, a move that protects B and leads A to locate at   
 . The pair of locations (vA, vB) = (  
 , vq) satisfies the 
conditions of Lemma 7 and thus constitutes a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, if vB = vq occurs instead of 
vA = vq, then facility A responds by locating at   
  and again, an equilibrium is reached. 
 
Another special case occurs if vq is not edge-protected, but   
  is. Clearly,   
  ∉ Cq. Again invoke Lemma 12. If 
vA ∈ Cq then facility B's best response is to locate at   
  as there it captures w(  
 
) whereas elsewhere at a 
distance of at least SSS from A, it can never get more than w(  
 
) for some k. One of facility A's optimal 
responses is, in turn, to locate at vq. According to Lemma 7, this pair of locations is a Nash equilibrium. On the 
other hand, if vB ∈ Cq, and as, by assumption, vq is not edge-protected and |Cq| ≥ 2, A can locate at one of the 
vertices in Cq and cut out B. Wherever A locates in Cq, B's best response is to locate at vB =   
  which, again by 
virtue of Lemma 7, then constitutes a pair of Nash equilibria. This proves 
 
Corollary 13. If the median vq or its adjacent vertex   
  is edge-protected, then a Nash equilibrium will be 
reached in a sequential relocation process with short-term profit maximization objective. 
 
In the following we assume that neither vq nor   
  is edge-protected. According to Lemma 12, one of the two 
facilities will locate inside Cq after no more than n relocation moves. We can now distinguish between two 
cases. 
 
Case 1. vB ∈ Cq, i.e., facility B is the first to locate in Cq. As by assumption vq is not edge-protected, |Cq| ≥ 2 and 
Cq cannot include any edge-protected vertices, so that vB is currently not edge-protected. This leaves two 
subcases for consideration. 
 
Case 1a. vB = vq. Then A in its next move can cut out B by locating at v
*
 as v
*
 ∈ Cq by virtue of Lemma 8a. Now 
facility B's best response is to locate at v
**
 which then satisfies the conditions of Lemma 7b and a locational 
Nash equilibrium has been reached. 
 
Case 1b. vq ≠ vB ∈ Cq. One of facility A's optimal moves is to cut out B by locating at vq. Now, vA = vq and it is 
B's turn to relocate at some vertex vB̂. Clearly, B will not locate in Cq as it would be cut out (and, by assumption, 
at least one edge-protected vertex exists, so that Cq ⊊ V). 
 
(i) vB̂ ∈ C
*
. In this case, A can cut out B by locating at vÂ = v
*
, and in the next step, B will respond by relocating 
to v
**
 as per RR2. This is a Nash equilibrium. 
(ii) vB̂ ∉ C
*
. By virtue of Lemmas 8b, 8c, and 7b, v
**
 is B's best option to locate. Subsequently, A will move to 
v
*
 and again, an equilibrium has been reached. 
 
Case 2. vA ∈ Cq, i.e., facility A is the first to locate at some vertex vA ∈ Cq. In order to obtain a positive market 
share, facility B must move to a vertex vB̂ ∈ V\Cq. This is the same situation as that discussed in subcase (ii) 
under 1b above which was already shown to lead to a Nash equilibrium. 
 
The above discussion implies 
 
Theorem 14. Given two facilities that locate at different vertices of a tree and the facilities charge fixed, but 
different mill prices. Then sequential relocation on the basis of short-term profit maximization, with rules as 
specified in cases 1, 2, and 3 above, will lead to Nash equilibrium locations. 
 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the problem of convergence of duopolists towards their respective equilibrium 
locations, given that decision makers at both facilities apply a short-term maximization objective. It was shown 
that, given some additional rules in case of ties, the duopolists will reach equilibrium locations in the process. 
 
The results presented in this paper open up a number of new avenues. One such possibility is the examination of 
"forbidden regions", a subject that was first studied by Katz and Cooper (1981). In our model, such forbidden 
zones could be vertices at which the competitors may not locate. Restrictions of this nature could be due to local 
zoning laws. It is apparent that the introduction of forbidden zones in a problem may dramatically change the 
results. Take, for example, the graph in Fig. 1 and assume that location at vertex v7 is prohibited. In this case, 
given SSS = 6, the only edge-protected vertex is now no longer available for location and a locational Nash 
equilibrium no longer exists. (In contrast, if in the original Hotelling model with variable prices and location 
and a linear market that stretches from 0 to L, we were to introduce a forbidden zone between ¼L and ¾L, then 
the model would indeed have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.) Results concerning competitive location 
models and forbidden zones have not been reported in the literature. 
 
A number of other research directions is also possible. For instance, one may examine scenarios in which one or 
both of the planners at the facilities make their decisions with foresight. Another possibility is to investigate 
models in which customers do not patronize the facility with the lowest delivered price, but use other 
(deterministic) utility functions, such as proportional models, similar to that used by Bauer et al. (1993). 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 7. (i) We first prove necessity of each of the three conditions by contradiction. Suppose that 
v** is not edge-protected. Then either (i) S(B)=0 and B could increase its sales by locating at any edge-
protected vertex (if A were to be located at the only edge-protected vertex, then B would capture its own vertex 
and S (B) > 0). Alternatively, (ii) S(B) > 0 in which case A could relocate so as to cut out B; hence the current 
arrangement is not an equilibrium. 
 
Suppose now that v
**
 does not satisfy condition (b). Then B could relocate to the vertex with the heaviest 
hinterland outside C
*
 and capture a larger share of the market. 
 
Finally, let M(A) ≠   
  . Then either (i) v
*
 ∈   
   but there exists in the competitive region a vertex vi ∈   
   ∩ 
M(B), in which case A could move towards B and capture vi as well, thus increasing its market area, or (ii) v
*
 
  
  , in which case A either cuts out B, which is not possible as v
**
 is edge-protected, as per condition (a), or A 
could improve by locating, so that M(A) =   
  . This demonstrates that each of the three conditions is necessary 
for (v
*
, v
**
) to be an equilibrium. 
 
(ii) We now prove sufficiency of conditions (a)−(c). Conditions (a) and (c) ensure that facility A has no incen-
tive to move, as per (a) facility A cannot cut out B, and by way of (c) A captures all of the market except B's 
hinterland. Condition (c) also implies that A's market share is maximal, given B. Furthermore, given that A 
locates at vA = v
*
, B's market share is maximal by way of condition (b).   ∎ 
 
Proof of Lemma 8. (a) We first prove that vq ∈ Cq. Suppose not. Then by Lemma 7b, v
**
 must be located just 
outside C
*
 on the path p*q = ]v
*
,…,vq]. By virtue of Lemma 7a, v
**
 is edge-protected, but by the above 
assumption vq is not, hence v
**
 vq, so that p*q = [v
*
, v
**
, vq]. Thus facility A located at v
*
 captures strictly less 
than ½w(T) (strictly less, as A's market share cannot exceed w(  
 
) ≤ ½w(T) by Lemma 3, but as it does not 
capture w(v
**
) > 0, the inequality is strict). On the other hand, Lemma 3 also implies that if facility A were to 
locate at vq it would capture at least ½w(T) which contradicts the assumption that vq ∉ C*. Hence vq ∈ C* which, 
in turn, implies that v
*
 ∈ Cq. 
 
(b) By definition, the circle Cq cannot include edge- protected vertices. However, Lemma 7a states that v
**
 is 
edge-protected; which is a contradiction. 
(c) Vertex v** is edge-protected as per Lemma 7a, thus it cannot be in C*.  ∎ 
 
References: 
Anderson S (1987) Spatial competition and price leadership. International Journal of Industrial Organization 
5:369-398 
Bauer A, Domschke W, Pesch E (1993) Competitive location on a network. European Journal of Operational 
Research 66: 372-391 Eiselt HA (1992) Hotelling's duopoly on a tree. Annals of Operations Research 
40:195-207 
Eiselt HA, Laporte G (1991) Locational equilibrium of two facilities on a tree. Operations Research/Recherche 
opérationnelle 25:5-18 
Eiselt HA, Laporte G, Thisse J-F (1993) Competitive location models: a framework and bibliography. 
Transportation Science 27: 44-54 
Friesz TL, Miller TC, Tobin RL (1988) Competitive network location models: a survey. Papers of the Regional 
Science Association 65:47-57 
Goldman AJ (1971) Optimal center location in simple networks. Transportation Science 5:212-221 
Hakimi SL (1983) On locating new facilities in a competitive environment. European Journal of Operational 
Research 12:29-35 
Hakimi SL (1990) Locations with spatial interactions: competitive locations and games. In: Mirchandani PB, 
Francis RL (eds) Discrete location theory. Wiley Interscience, New York, pp 439-478 
Hotelling H (1929) Stability in competition. Economic Journal 39: 41-57 
Katz IN, Cooper L (1981) Facility location in the presence of forbidden regions. L Formulation and the case of 
Euclidean distances with one forbidden circle. European Journal of Operational Research 6:166-173 
Labbé M, Hakimi SL (1991) Market and locational equilibrium for two competitors. Operations Research 
39:749-756 
ReVelle C (1986) The maximum capture or 'sphere of influence' location problem: Hotelling revisited on a 
network. Journal of Regional Science 26:343-358 
Stackelberg H von (1943) Grundlagen der theoretischen Volkswirtschaftslehre. Translated by: Peacock AT, The 
Theory of the Market Economy (1952). Hodge, London Edinburgh Glasgow 
Tirole J (1995) The theory of industrial organization. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 
Tovey CA (1993) Dynamical convergence of majority rules to c-cores in Euclidean spaces. Working paper, 
School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, GA 
Wendell RE, McKelvey RD (1981) New perspectives in competitive location theory. European Journal of 
Operational Research 6:174-182 
